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Abstract—The growth of IoT devices during the last decade
has led the development of smart ecosystems, such as smart
homes, prone to cyberattacks. Traditional security methodologies
support to some extend the requirement for preserving privacy
and security of such deployments, but their centralized nature in
conjunction with low computational capabilities of smart home
gateways make such approaches not efficient. Last achievements
on blockchain technologies allowed the use of such decentralized
architectures to support cybersecurity defence mechanisms. In
this work, a blockchain framework is presented to support the
cybersecurity mechanisms of smart homes installations, focusing
on the immutability of users and devices that constitute such
environments. The proposed methodology provides also the
appropriate smart contracts support for ensuring the integrity of
the smart home gateway and IoT devices, as well as the dynamic
and immutable management of blocked malicious IPs. The
framework has been deployed on a real smart home environment
demonstrating its applicability and efficiency.
Index Terms—Blockchain, smart home, IoT, Cybersecurity
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology has been adopted during the last
years in many application domains in order to strengthen
security issues in a decentralized manner. Due to its nature,
this technology has direct applicability to Internet of Things
smart homes environments, as it can support security-related
use cases.
In this work, a blockchain security defence mechanism is
proposed targeting IoT smart homes. The framework supports
smart contracts for implementing registration of users and
hardware elements that constitute a smart home, while real-
izing security related operations for ensuring the integrity of
these elements and blacklisting of malicious IPs. The method-
ology introduces a blockchain technology agnostic solution
that can be adopted easily for any installation with minimal
requirements on the smart home gateways.
The solution proposed, developed under GHOST EU
project, [1]–[3] and coupled with behavioral anomaly detection
procedures, provides a novel defence mechanism for smart
homes. Towards this, a private Ethereum network has been
established, for demonstrating the applicability and efficiency
of the proposed implementation on lightweight hardware
(Gateways) that is used for managing the IoT devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
discusses the related work on the research field, whereas Sec-
tion III presents background information regarding its appli-
cability on a real deployment using the Ethereum Blockchain
infrastructure. Section IV presents the proposed components
for enhancing the security of smart home installations, while
Section V summarizes the conclusions of the study.
II. RELATED WORK
A 2016 literature review [4] identified various research pa-
pers that use the Blockchain technology in other areas beyond
cryptocurrencies, including data storage management, identity
management, rating systems, data and goods trading, with only
four use cases being identified as applicable in the context of
IoT. Nevertheless, the IoT domain and its applicability for
Blockchain solutions continued to raise attention in research
and industrial deployments [5], [6]. The main reason behind
this trend is the structure of the IoT, currently evolving to the
Internet of Everything, where Blockchain ensures reliability
and security of the IoT systems through its traceability and
openness characteristics [7].
The use of the blockchain technology also recently gained
interest in the cyber security domain. In particular, the use
of smart contracts was incorporated in the design and im-
plementation of a DDoS defence mechanism in [8]. The use
of the existing public infrastructure of Ethereum to advertise
blacklisted IPs suspected to be involved in ongoing DDoS
attacks is fully exploited in this work. The use of timeout
notions while creating white/black/grey lists of IP addresses
for firewall and corresponding nodes classification is discussed
in [9]. Another interesting approach of using blacklists is
discussed in [10], in the field of Vehicular Wireless Networks.
The use of Blockchain in a smart home installation of IoT
devices, discussed in [11], demonstrates the implementation
of the security in smart homes in terms of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability with a comparatively low overhead
introduction. A secure communication platform in a smart
city was presented in [12] as part of a Blockchain based
security framework. A cost-effective secure architecture for
smarthomes with promising results on the resources con-
sumption and not requiring any cloud storage is presented
in [13]. The presented model utilises a hybrid version of the
Blockchain, consortium blockchain, where the user’s perfor-
mance as a node has been eliminated. Singh et al. developed
an efficient and secure smarthome architecture [14], which
is based on the cloud computing and Blockchain technology.
This architecture provides a network attack detection and
response system, yet it lacks the validation through the real
deployment in the smarthomes.
Using the Blockchain technology, which mainly provides
trust between nodes, seems to be an effective approach to
facilitate the future underlying infrastructure for IoT. Huckle
et al. presented IoT scenarios where Blockchain can be used
to enable sharing economies of different assets [15]. By using
smart IoT devices it is possible to automatically restrict or
grant access to assets like vehicles or buildings according
to rules implied by smart contracts without the need for
any human intervention. Lee and Lee proposed to use the
Blockchain to certify IoT devices running on the latest and
most secure firmware [16]. This is an interesting approach,
that could also employ the creation of an open market between
manufacturers, end-users, validators and penetration testers.
However, there are limitations with respect to the application
of the proper rules in the devices to provide the initiative for
all stakeholders to push for more secure firmware installed on
deployed devices.
III. BACKGROUND
GHOST - Safe-Guarding Home IoT Environments with
Personalised Real-time Risk Control is an European Union
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation funded project [2],
providing the deployment context for the herein presented SC
use cases. The GHOST architecture, presented in [1], envisions
a singular solution, deployed on a home gateway device,
which is capable of monitoring all IoT devices in a smart
home environment. It enables endusers (home habitants) to
become aware and understand the cybersecurity risks (threats
and vulnerabilities), and to take informative decisions affecting
their cyber-physical security and privacy. The solution is built
up from several layers, including the Data Interception and
Inspection layer responsible for aggregating and analysing
network traffic; the Contextual Profiling layer that further
analyses on the output from the previous layer to establish
device behaviour and more specifically report on anomalies;
the Risk Assessment layer that gathers all the information
about anomalies and correlates them to current and potential
risks; finally the Control and Monitoring layer that presents a
graphical interface to the end user.
As a cybersecurity solution it is imperative to be able to
trust and rely on its execution. Meaning, the software itself
and everything in its digital periphery are to be included
in the integrity management to ensure a safe and trusted
environment. Based on this understanding, along its execution
pipeline several key aspects were identified as critical to ensure
trust of the system. Blockchain technology has been used in
the context of GHOST in various functions, namely integrity
management of users and devices, firmware validation of
the gateway and IoT devices and enhanced decision making
through collective IP blacklisting. The integration of the SCs
are part of the Blockchain Defence Infrastructure that interacts
with each of the aforementioned GHOST layers.
The GHOST Blockchain Defence Infrastructure consists of
a deployed private Ethereum Blockchain on top of an inter-
connected grid of smart home installations of IoT devices.
Each smart home features a device that will act as the smart
home gateway middleware and simultaneously as a Blockchain
node. Due to their limited processing power, this type of
devices act as light nodes, therefore additional, full nodes with
adequate processing power are required to act as miners within
the network.
IV. BLOCKCHAIN SOLUTION FOR CYBERSECURITY OF IOT
The component described herein is a blockchain based
component that can be installed at a smart home gateway
and provide enhanced cyber-security functionality for both
the administrator of the installation and the smart home
owner. The component can be applied in a context where
there are one or more IoT service providers and multiple
smart home installations. The component offers the following
functionalities :
• Registration of Devices and Users and User Consent
• Firmware validation
• Collaborative IP blacklisting
1) Registration of Devices and Users and User Consent:
The processes of registration of users and devices along with
the management of the consent of users with respect to the
service are tightly coupled and are implemented under the
scope of the same smart contract. Data stored in the contract
are anonymized hashes that can be retrieved by the distributed
ledger and cross-checked with local stored information. This
separation enables for deployment in public Blockchain en-
vironments, since publicly available information on the chain
are stripped of description or other sensitive information. This
approach simplifies registration of gateways and devices as
well as permission handling.
The user access control is performed solely by the Smart
Contract (SC). Three types of users are allowed:
• Owner: The Owner of the contract is the entity that
deployed the SC on the Blockchain or gained the role by a
transfer of ownership from a previous owner. The Owner
is a superuser that can add or remove Administrators and
Users, add or remove Gateways and IoT devices and add
or remove certified software hashes. The Owner of the
contract cannot be an owner of a Gateway. The user type
for the Owner is 1.
• Administrators: The Administrator is an entity that has
the same rights as the Owner, except that Administrators
cannot add or remove other Administrators. The user
type for the Administrators is 1, the same as the Owner.
It should be noted that the Owner is also considered
an Administrator. Administrators are not allowed to be
owners of a Gateways, since this would be controversial
to their role.
• User: The User is an entity that can sign or unsign the
Consent related to the ownership of a Gateway. Users
have no other rights. The user type for the Users is 10.
The SC retains Gateways as an array of structures inside the
contract. Each Gateway structure retains its corresponding IoT
devices. Each Gateway structure is composed of the following
members:
• Gateway ID: This can be any unique string or a hashed
string derived from a string describing the Gateway
uniquely, i.e: its MAC address (or the hash of the
MAC address). Derivation is performed using the SHA3
(Keccak256) hashing method. Uniqueness of the ID is
checked during addition of Gateways. The Gateway ID
is a mandatory input for registering a Gateway to the
smart contract. Since MAC addresses are not considered
as sensitive data, it can be used as Gateway IDs in plain
text.
• Gateway status: The status of the Gateway is described
by an unsigned integer that can be assigned the values 0
or 1 corresponding to deleted or active.
• Last modification: The last modification is the timestamp
of the last action performed on the members or properties
of a Gateway. In practice the timestamp coincides with
the timestamp of the block that included the transaction
that modified the Gateway.
• Owner (User): The address of the owner of the Gateway
is retained in the Gateway structures. The address of the
user owning the Gateway is required in order to link the
Gateway to the user, as well as allow for restricting the
signing / unsigning of the consent corresponding to that
Gateway to its owner. The address of the owner is a
mandatory input for registering a Gateway to the smart
contract.
• Consent: The consent is expressed by the value of an
unsigned integer. Consent can be 0 or 1.
• IoT devices list: The IoT devices are identified as unique
strings (IDs) describing these devices (i.e. MAC address
or the hash of the MAC address). These hashes are stored
in an array.
• Number of IoT devices: A variable retaining the number
of registered IoT active / inactive devices.
Following the same approach with the Gateways, the SC
retains an array of IoT structures. Each IoT structure is
composed of the following members:
• IoT device: This can be any unique string or a hashed
string derived from a string describing the IoT uniquely,
i.e: its MAC address (or the hash of the MAC address).
Derivation is performed using the SHA3 (Keccak256)
hashing method. Uniqueness of the ID is checked during
addition of IoTs. The IoT ID is a mandatory input for
registering a Gateway to the smart contract. Since MAC
addresses are not considered as sensitive data, it can be
used as Gateway IDs in plain text.
• IoT status: The status of the IoT is described by an
unsigned integer that can be assigned the values 0 or
1 corresponding to deleted or active.
• Last modification: The last modification is the timestamp
of the last action performed on the members or properties
of an IoT. In practice the timestamp coincides with the
timestamp of the block that included the transaction that
modified the IoT.
• IoT type: The IoT type is expressed by the value of a hex
string representing the type of an IoT device (i.e Motion
Sensor, etc).
• IoT uuid: The IoT uuid are identified as the hashed value
of the universal unique identifier with which system Ad-
ministrators add the device in the local Gateway database.
The uniqueness of a Gateway, before addition to the array
of Gateways in the smart contract, is enforced by a map-
ping (injection) G from Gateway ID to an unsigned integer
G : ID → J . This mapping is also used for random access
to the array. The default value of the integer corresponding to
a registered gateway belongs to [1, NGW ] ⊂ N, with NGW
denoting the total number of Gateways, while if a Gateway
is not already registered the value J is zero. Random access
to the elements of the Gateways array can be performed as
Gateways[G(ID)−1] = Gateways[J−1], for matrices with
zero based indexing. Thus, addition of a Gateway requires
G(ID) = J = 0. Each new Gateway is added in the end of
the Gateways array in position NGW and its corresponding
value in the mapping is set to NGW + 1. In order to remove
a Gateway with Gateway ID (ID) the mapping is set to
G(ID) = 0 and the status of the Gateway is set to 0.
This removal procedure does not involve moving or copying
structures, thus enabling reduced computational complexity as
well as cost for public blockchain deployments. To further
improve performance, a variable denoting the number of
registered Gateways NrGW (numOfGWs) is retained in the
contract. This variable increases by 1 when a new Gateway is
added and decreased by 1 on deletion. Retaining the number
of registered Gateways in the contract, results in avoiding
searching operations required by get type functions, thus
reducing cost of deployment of the contract. It should be
noted that deletion of a Gateway results in deletion of all its
constituent IoT devices.
In the case of IoT devices, their registration follows the
same procedure. Similarly, a mapping from IoT ID to an
unsigned integer I : ID → J . This mapping is also used
for random access to the array of IoT structures. Random
access to the elements of the IoTs array can be performed as
IoTs[I(ID)− 1] = IoTs[J − 1]. Addition can be performed
only if I(ID) = 0. The deletion of a device is performed by
setting the status of the IoT device to 0 and I(ID) = J = 0.
In order to improve performance, each Gateway retains the
number of registered IoT devices NrIoT , avoiding search
operations during call of get type functions, thus reducing cost
of deployment of the contract.
The registration / deletion of Gateways and IoT devices can
be performed only by the Administrators.
The retrieval of information, concerning Gateways and IoT
devices, from the SC can be performed with get type functions.
These functions return info for all Gateways, info for a
Gateway with a specific UID or info for all IoT devices of
a Gateway with a specific UID.
The main functions that have been realised in the SC with
regards to this functionality are:
• Registration of Users and Administrators: The Ad-
ministrators are responsible for the registration of Users.
The Administrators can be registered by the Owner of
the SC. The Owner can also register Users. The contract
retains a common registry to ensure uniqueness of Users
and Administrators.
• Registration of Gateways: The Administrators, are able
to register the Gateways and each Gateway is assigned
to one registered User corresponding to its smart home.
Each Gateway is described by a unique identifier, that can
be derived, for example, by the MAC address or com-
bination of other characteristics of the Gateway device.
A User is identified by the Address on the blockchain.
Moreover, administrators or the Owner of the smart con-
tract can remove Gateways from the distributed ledger.
After the registration of a Gateway, the User should sign
the consent related to this Gateway. The contract retains
a common registry to ensure uniqueness of Gateways.
• Registration of IoT devices: The registration of IoT
devices is performed by the Administrators or the Owner
of the contract. Each IoT is characterised by a unique id
which can be derived its MAC address or combination of
characteristics. The contract retains a common registry to
ensure uniqueness of IoT devices across all Gateways.
• Signing / Unsigning of consent form: A User that owns
a Gateway is able to sign the consent corresponding to
its registered Gateway. The User side consent can be
removed at any moment for a given Gateway.
• Change of ownership of the contract: The contract
enables for change of ownership. The current Onwer
can pass ownership of the contract to another blockchain
address.
A visual representation of the main flows is depicted in Fig.
1.
2) Firmware Integrity: The second main functionality of-
fered by the system is the validation of firmware of gateways
and devices. The main concept is based on the fact that a sig-
nificant number of cyber-security attacks relate to modifying
one or more of the existing files of a system. The integrity
of the firmware/software of each Gateway (and potentially of
IoT devices that support that) is periodically checked against
the SC. The administrator of the installation stores in the SC
the hashes of all valid firmware/software versions released. A
service that constantly runs in the Gateway calculates the hash
of a predefined part of the filesystem and checks it against the
Fig. 1. An example flow of operations: (a) User registration, (b) Gateway
registration from Administrator and signing of consent by the owning user,
(c) Registration of constituent IoT devices, (d) Registration of hashes related
to firmware, (e) Periodic check of software integrity of the Gateway and IoT
devices.
set of hashes of the valid firmware versions stores in the SC.
The component reports both the event of an invalid hash and
the event of an interruption of the execution of the service
(which could potentially be part of an attack).
The contract allows for registering hashes of firmware (or
software) allowed for installation on the registered devices of
the IoT system. These hashes are computed using a hashing
scheme such as: IMO, MD5, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384
or SHA512 and are stored to the Blockchain through a
mapping H : (HASH) → B, with HASH denoting the
computed hash after rehashing with the SHA3 method and
B a Boolean value denoting existence. The computed hashes
are rehashed in order to ensure constant size of the hash that
would be given as input to the mapping. The integrity of the
installed firmware can be checked frequently by the Gateway
or other devices against hashes stored on the Blockchain.
The registration or removal of hashes can be performed by
the Administrators. Moreover, the data structure (mapping)
retaining all hashes is not iterable and can be accessed only
randomly with knowledge of the hashes.
3) Blocking Blacklisted IP Addresses: Due to the dis-
tributed structure of IoT systems it is common to have infor-
mation (through which knowledge can be produced) generated
in different nodes of a network. Combining such knowledge
can be beneficial for the whole system, given that the integrity
of the combined data can be preserved. The functionality
of the system proposed is related to the combination of the
information about problematic IP addresses between different
smart home installations. Two different types of IPs blacklist-
ing are envisaged public and private. The first one refers to the
functionality of a collaboratively maintained knowledge base
for public IPs reputation. Each smart home gateway report
IPs as malicious to a single smart contract while the same
contract can be queried for a reputation score for a specific
IP. The reported reputation score is cumulatively calculated
upon the reports of all gateways. The second type refers to
a private blacklisting / whitelisting functionality where each
gateway has its own smart contract to which it backups to and
restores from its locally maintained black and white lists. This
feature will enable gateways to double check the integrity of
their local lists.
a) Public Blacklisting: For the public blacklisting func-
tionality, a shared and publicly available knowledge of po-
tentially malicious IP addresses is maintained in a smart
contract. The contract will contain a list of records, each
one corresponding to the event that an installation (of the
component) has reported an IP as malicious. These records
cannot be maliciously altered or deleted, as such an action
would need to alter data already stored in the blockchain,
which is extremely hard.
The calculation of bad reputation score for each external IP,
is mainly based upon three factors:
• the number recent reports related to the specific IP
• the cardinality of distinct report submitters for those
records
• the time elapsed since each on of those reports
The main concept for the calculation approach is that, when
reports for a specific IP start appearing, then its bad reputation
score starts increasing. The more such reports come by the
larger the score becomes. If those originate from the same
source then each subsequent reports has a reduced effect
to the final score. This practically protects the system from
malicious users that would like to intentionally increase the
bad reputation score for a specific IP (given that they control
a single or a few identities in the system). Each reports effect
is gradually limited as time goes by. In order for the score of
an IP to remain high it is required to continuously have new
reports for the specific IP from varying sources. This feature
enables the gradual restoration of the reputation of the IP of
a legitimate host, that a malicious user has temporarily taken
control of.
Fig. 2. Reputation score for a specific IP
The formula that calculates a bad reputation score for each
IP is depicted in Equation 2. The approach of dividing the time
in discrete time frames or steps has been applied to implement
a scheme that takes into account more recent values with
a higher weight. The score is calculated for a specific time
period, a specific length of time steps denoted as tp. If the




− ln (cf)srt(λ)tn−t (1)
The srt is equal to 1, if there is a record for the IP in
time step t and equal to 0 otherwise. The summation does not
accumulate values for the time steps at which no record exists
for the specific IP.
The λ factor is a decay parameter that takes values in the
range (0, 1). The higher the value of λ is the strongest the
memory of the scheme is. Lower λ values mean that the
scoring scheme penalises old values in a more heavy way.
Finally, the cf ∈ [0, 1] parameter stands for the cardinality
factor and penalises the case where all records come from
the same submitting address. It is equal to the ratio of the
nember of distinct submitters to the total number of records
for the specific IP that have been reported in the time window





This parameter practically protects the reputation of IP from
spamming accounts, that would want to harm the owner of an
IP by repeatedly submitting blacklisting records for this IP.
Figure 2 shows the calculated reputation score for a partic-
ular malicious IP, given that the relevant reports for this IP are
shown by the coloured dots. The colour of each dot represents
the unique id of the submitter of the report. For instance, all
red dots are representing submissions of Submitter 1, all blue
dots come from Submitter 2 etc.
It is evident in the graph that the scoring scheme values
reports according to how recent they are. This is why the
score starts to decrease with time after a specific report, at
least until a new report is submitted. The rate at which the
scheme phases out the past reports is dictated by the decay
parameter λ.
Additionally, not all reports contribute the same value to
the total reputation score for a particular IP. If a submitter
keeps sending reports for the same IP, then every new report
is weighted less. This is evident in the case of the first two
reports by Submitter 3, i.e. the first two green dots, or in the
case of the first two submissions by Submitter 2, i.e. the first
two blue dots approximately at t = 200. In contrast, when
Submitter 2 keeps quiet for a period of time, his records start
again to be valued more, at t = 470.
b) Private Black/Whitelisting: The private blacklisting
and whitelisting of the IP addresses is a variation of the
public blacklisting, where the reports for IP addresses have
influence only on a per installation basis. Despite any public
recommendation (i.e. Public blacklisting), a user still can have
personalised settings and a set of rules. Each smart home
gateway is associated with a smart contract where a private
list of rules is recorded. Each rule in turn is encrypted together
with a state indicating to which list it belongs (i.e. blacklist,
whitelist or none for the purpose of resetting the state).
Practically the gateway can maintain a copy for each one
of the its private whitelist and blackclist into a smart contract.
It can then either add an IP, remove an IP or check if it exists
in the smart contract. Through this mechanism the gateway
can have an integrity guarantee for the IPs existing in its local
lists.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a decentralized approach for supporting
IoT security in smart homes through blockchain technology.
The mechanisms developed support a variety of functions for
registering users and functional elements of a smart home,
and more security oriented tools for ensuring the integrity
of software and firmware installed, as well as dynamic and
immutable IP blacklisting procedures.
The whole framework has been deployed and evaluated in
real smart homes, under the purposes of the GHOST EU
project, enhancing the cybersecurity defence mechanisms in
a decentralized manner under a private blockchain network.
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